For the first time, Organization of Turkic States (OTS) leaders met on EU soil, gathering in the Hungarian capital from May 20 to 21. The summit, hosted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, left two stubborn questions hanging over the Danube. First, does Orban's hospitality signal that Hungary truly has influential friends beyond Brussels? Second, can the 15-year-old OTS move from slogans to granular projects such as digital wallets, faster freight checks and, above all, non-Russian gas?
The OTS has long been questioned for prioritizing symbolism over substance, with pledges of solidarity filling every OTS communiqué. Its "Turkic World Vision 2040" outlines goals, from a joint satellite program to a unified alphabet. Yet its flagship financial vehicle, the Turkic Investment Fund (TIF), has stalled. Launched with $500 million in capital – and bolstered by Hungary’s $100 million pledge – the TIF has yet to disburse a single dollar.
The Budapest Declaration urged the “launch of project activities” for the TIF, a polite but public nudge that the money must start flowing. “Actual disbursement of funds” is the single clearest step from symbolism to substance, argues Eldaniz Gusseinov, a researcher at Istanbul’s Ibn Haldun University. Once the money crosses borders, investors will treat the OTS as something that can deliver meaningful private-sector support.
Small-scale successes hint at potential. The Turan digital wallet, launched in 2023, now facilitates near-instant, fee-free transfers across six Turkic jurisdictions, including the contested Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Yet without integration into metro systems or co-branded cards, such tools risk remaining in the niche.
While financial transactions are beginning to move, goods still face delays. The "Middle Corridor" – a trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caspian – loses days to paperwork at border checks.
The Budapest Declaration does not introduce a new solution but welcomes the implementation of the Simplified Customs Corridor Agreement, signed in Samarkand in 2022, which enables electronic data sharing to reduce delays. While not a panacea, it avoids the need for costly infrastructure upgrades. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stressed the corridor’s strategic value: “We attach great importance to cooperation within the organization for the success of the Middle Corridor, and we expect the support of the member states.”
Critically, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – a project with 27 tunnels and a long mountain pass – broke ground this year. Once completed, it will slash transit times and carry 10 million-15 million tons of cargo annually, a tangible step toward integrating the Turkic heartland into global supply chains.
Hungary’s hosting of the OTS summit comes at a fraught moment in its relationship with the EU. Brussels has frozen 18 billion euros ($20.3 billion) in funds over rule-of-law concerns, including judicial independence and anti-corruption reforms. Orban’s government, however, framed the event as proof of Hungary’s geopolitical agility.
Yet energy, a sector critical to Hungary’s strategy, saw no new deals in Budapest. The more important move occurred earlier: In June 2024, Hungary’s state-owned MVM acquired a 5% stake in Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field, a project pivotal to Europe’s efforts to reduce Russian gas dependence. Despite this, Hungary still remains deeply dependent on Russian energy, with over 80% of its gas imports coming from Russia.
From Baku’s perspective, the purchase “helps shift the OTS toward becoming an economic platform,” says Mr. Gusseinov. The numbers back him up: Azerbaijani gas now reaches 12 countries – eight inside the EU – and lifted export income from $5.6 billion in 2021 to almost $15 billion in 2022.
For Brussels, the OTS’s evolution carries both promise and peril. A functional Turkic bloc could help diversify energy supplies and counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia. Yet EU officials view Orban’s overtures skeptically, seeing them less as strategic alliances and more as attempts to deflect scrutiny over democratic values.
No landmark deals emerged from Budapest, but the summit revealed a pragmatic shift. The OTS is now prioritizing projects with economic returns – digital trade agreements, customs reforms and energy corridors.
Powers like Hungary and Türkiye are hedging their bets: engaging Beijing economically, buying Western arms, and now nurturing the OTS as a third pillar. The bloc’s lightweight structure – avoiding veto powers and rigid bureaucracy – suits their transactional diplomacy.
The true test lies beyond the summit’s glow. Can the OTS convert rhetoric about a “Turkic century” into cubic meters of gas, seamless digital transactions, and container ships moving swiftly along the Middle Corridor? The delivery will determine whether the OTS becomes a force.
