The recent drone attacks in East Africa, particularly in Sudan, should not be interpreted solely as a reflection of a civil war. On the one hand, this situation can also be interpreted as a process manifesting itself in the context of proxy strategies centered in the Gulf. The attacks targeting civilian targets in Port Sudan in recent weeks have affected not only this country but also the region and even global trade.
They also threaten the security of the Red Sea from one end to the other. The fragile balances of East Africa, which has been frequently associated with political crises recently, the security of the Red Sea, and the civil war and crisis environments where individual interests take precedence over national interests are creating a global turbulence area through proxy wars. Indeed, the events in Sudan reveal that the foreign policy tendencies of the actors destabilizing the region have gained quite a dangerous dimension.
Recently, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the RSF's external supporters were behind the drone attacks carried out in Port Sudan in the first week of May. However, the full names of these supporters were not given in official statements, and the expression "a regional sponsor" was used. Although this is a vague definition, the country directly referred to is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Attacks on civilian facilities, diplomatic structures and fuel-energy infrastructure in a strategic city such as Port Sudan in Sudan have posed a direct threat to the Sudanese army and have deeply threatened the security architecture in the Red Sea region. With the external support it receives, the attacks carried out by the RSF endanger regional and global maritime trade routes. Therefore, this situation risks triggering a potential crisis that could affect global transportation passing through the Suez Canal.
Radar systems, military bases and field hospitals established in port cities such as Berbera, Bosaso and Assab reveal the region's increasing geopolitical importance in recent years. In this context, Bosaso Airport has gained a central position in operations in the Horn of Africa in the last two years. According to Flight Radar data, the number of shipments claimed to support the RSF has increased from an estimated two to 50 per month between April 2023 and April 2025. This situation revealed that the activities in the region have taken on a multi-dimensional structure.
It is strongly asserted that the RSF's combat capabilities in Sudan have improved thanks to this corridor. On fronts like Nyala, el-Nahud, el-Obeid, Port Sudan and Omdurman, there is an observable enhancement in UAVs, artillery and electronic warfare capacities. The downing of an RSF plane in Nyala by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on May 3, 2025, and the discovery that its pilot was Kenyan and the technician South Sudanese, indicates that this corridor facilitates not only weapons but also human resource transfers.
The successive drone attacks carried out during the week of May 5 on Port Sudan point to RSF's growing airstrike capabilities. A report published by Amnesty International suggests that the UAE is a likely suspect behind this capacity, allegedly supplying RSF with Chinese-made precision-guided weapons and drones. Although these claims have not been officially confirmed, the synchronized attacks on civilian infrastructure in Port Sudan indicate that RSF's technical competence on the ground exceeds local capabilities. This suggests that the RSF is not acting alone and that intensive foreign actor support is significantly destabilizing Sudan, and, through the established logistics network, the broader East Africa region.
According to open-source data, it is evident that the southern part of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are overwhelmed by bases in Bosaso, Abd-al Kuri, Berbera, Mayyun, Mocha, Al-Mukalla and Bani al-Hakam. The expansion model, which is shaped by objectives such as controlling gold fields, accessing agricultural land, and penetrating ports via sea routes to increase regional economic and political influence, redefines the geoeconomic dynamics of the continent. In this context, the corridor stretching from Bosaso in Somalia to Port Sudan is not merely a supply or logistics chain. It also risks creating a continuous climate of insecurity along Africa's eastern shores. Indeed, this corridor now affects not only Somalia and Sudan, but also a broader geography including Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Libya.
At this point, a new narrative is gaining traction in public discourse. Alongside the support provided to the RSF, the SAF's connections with certain regional alliances are also being highlighted to construct a new bloc in the international arena. The Sudanese theater has thus gone beyond the immediate parties to the conflict, becoming an extension of the regional security architecture, with the potential to deepen existing instability in the Horn of Africa.
Therefore, the security-centered transformation occurring in East Africa must be examined not only in terms of increased military presence but also in terms of how this presence is positioned in conflict zones and which actors are directly or indirectly affected. It is also important to understand how infrastructure investments, humanitarian aid elements and commercial projects intertwine with a broader security architecture. For this reason, the search for peace and stability in East Africa requires not only domestic reconciliation among internal actors but also a transparent approach to foreign interventions and a commitment to multilateral cooperation.
The interest of external actors in this strategic line extends from Berbera Port to Assab and Bosaso to Aden. This interest is reflected in many areas, especially infrastructure and development investments. This interest is also shaped by security-based tools such as arms transfers, Unmanned Aerial Systems and mercenary deployments. Therefore, this situation causes the structure to become even more complex and security concerns to increase among the region's people. The fragile balances in the Horn of Africa are becoming even more sensitive.
The claims that the RSF was openly supported in the Sudanese civil war are now being replaced by reality. In this context, satellite images clearly show that RSF military vehicles were deployed in civilian residential areas, and civilian structures were converted into militia headquarters. The airstrike conducted by the SAF on Al-Juneineh Airport, in which a fuel depot was hit, provided strong evidence that the RSF was transporting aviation fuel and ammunition to the region.
When open-source data obtained from different countries is examined, it is seen that the prominent logistics and operational lines directly related to the conflicts in Sudan also indirectly affect countries such as Somalia, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Chad. Therefore, it is seen that in the face of this situation, borders have become more permeable and activities carried out through proxy structures have gained a multinational dimension. In particular, the flights from Bosaso to Nyala Airport, which are under the control of the RSF in recent weeks and which are made without specifying the destination in open sources but whose departure and arrival points are known, reveal how Nairobi-based private aviation companies are used in this equation. In this context, it is claimed by many sources that the planes that took off from Abu Dhabi, landed at the UAE base in Bosaso, and then continued to Nyala were carrying military personnel or mercenaries. One of these planes was shot down by the Sudanese Air Force in recent weeks and a Kenyan pilot lost his life in the incident. Based on all this information, it can be seen that the regional conflict environment has turned into a complex proxy war network extending from Kenya to Somalia, Chad to the UAE.
In this context, the international community's silence in the face of the UAE's actions is striking. Although the U.N., African Union, U.S. and EU have condemned the attacks, no concrete sanctions have been brought to the agenda against the RSF's regional supporters. However, the current situation threatens not only Sudan's sovereignty but also the security of all of East Africa and the Red Sea, as well as indirectly, global trade.
This proxy war strategy implemented in East Africa is dragging the region into greater chaos. Moreover, new discourses that Israel is trying to position the Sudanese army within the "Iran-Hamas axis" in line with its security interests indicate that a new conflict zone may emerge between the Middle East and Africa. Conducting such an intense proxy war on both sides of the Red Sea creates a threat of instability regionally and globally. When financing, intelligence, human resources, and technology are involved in these wars, the luxury of remaining silent is no longer available to any actor on the ground in the Horn of Africa.
