The Houthis, who have controlled the Yemeni capital Sanaa since 2014, have emerged as a serious cross-border actor for the first time since November 2023. Prior to that, the Houthis were primarily focused on Yemen rather than their transboundary reputation, which has been largely negative. However, lately, the Houthis transformed their opposition to Israel into a cross-border military mobilization with the claim of supporting Palestine. Thereby, they have been significantly targeted militarily by the U.S., the U.K. and Israel over the past two years.
As of March 15, 2025, the Donald Trump administration in the U.S. began targeting the Houthis militarily under the name “Operation Rough Rider,” conducting over 800 airstrikes over the course of two months. The strikes hit Houthi military assets, critical infrastructure and strategic locations.
On May 6, however, President Trump announced that Washington had reached a deal, brokered by Oman, to halt U.S. bombing in exchange for a Houthi cessation of attacks on American vessels. Yet, Houthi leaders immediately clarified that strikes on Israel or ships and tankers they deem “linked to Israel in any way” would continue unabated. The apparent disconnect between the rhetoric of the U.S. and Houthis reflects both the Houthis’ insistence on maintaining solidarity with Gaza and their strategic use of ambiguity to preserve maximum leverage.
The so-called cease-fire with the U.S. will likely give the Houthis breathing room to reconstitute their forces and replenish their missile and drone stockpiles through a combination of Iranian shipments and domestic production. In parallel, their ideological narrative, which frames their attacks as acts of solidarity with Gaza, appears to be potent for recruitment and internal cohesion. Whether as part of a political narrative or a genuine display of motivation, thousands of Houthis and the unarmed loyalists have gathered recently in Al-Sabeen Square in Sanaa in support of Palestine.
Therefore, what can be inferred from such forms of societal mobilization by the Houthis is that any form of cease-fire between the group and the U.S., as indicated by Trump, is inherently fragile, likely to be short-lived and dependent on specific conditions. In the absence of a comprehensive political settlement in Yemen that, either way, includes the Houthis, the movement is poised to remain a durable, asymmetric actor, capable of periodic escalations against Israeli and Western maritime interests while consolidating its hold over northwestern Yemen.
In recent days, reports have emerged suggesting that talks between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have broken down, raising the possibility that Trump may begin to pursue a Middle East policy independent of Netanyahu. From this standpoint, it becomes apparent that Trump’s policies toward the Houthis could diverge significantly from Israel’s. The Houthis view both actors through distinct lenses and respond with different strategies and policy approaches.
At that point, the U.S. had calibrated its approach toward the Houthis around protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, conducting heavy strikes to compel a halt to attacks on U.S.-flagged vessels, followed by diplomatic off-ramps under Omani mediation. Going forward, Washington is likely to sustain multinational maritime patrols, press for tighter arms-embargo enforcement, and explore the inclusion of Houthi representatives in a transitional governance framework – a holistic Yemen policy that combines security guarantees with political incentives.
However, Israel has signaled its intent to escalate independent strikes in Yemen, targeting Houthi missile sites, logistics hubs, and suspected Iranian arms-transfer nodes, actions it views as separate from the so-called U.S. truce. Israeli doctrine toward the Houthis includes “proportional retaliation” and deterrence through persistent pressure, involving deep-strike raids on Sanaa’s infrastructure or even on Iranian mainland facilities if Houthi attacks persist. As of the last week of May, the Israeli strikes against the Houthis and Houthi attacks deep into Israeli territory continue.
Years of intensive warfare in Yemen have shown that a full military defeat of the Houthis appears highly unlikely and too costly for every actor that could be involved in the process. The Houthis' guerrilla-style command structure, rugged territorial control and local legitimacy render them somewhat resilient to airpower alone. Moreover, their ability to disperse launch cells, adapt tactics and draw on external patronage means that kinetic campaigns, even at the scale of Operation Rough Rider by the U.S., can only degrade, not eliminate, the threat.
The Houthis also control rugged highlands and densely populated urban centers in northwestern Yemen – terrain that favors insurgent defense over conventional airpower. Historical precedents such as the Sa’ada Wars demonstrated earlier that airpower and occasional ground operations inflicted only short-term setbacks, as fighters melted back into mountain strongholds and civilian areas.
The Houthis operate through semi-autonomous brigades tied to tribal and local networks rather than a single, centralized hierarchy. This structure endows the movement with resilience: when one cell is degraded, others can reconstitute launch capabilities or assume its operational role. That is why airstrikes and naval bombardments, while capable of destroying launch sites and weapon depots, cannot sever the movement’s political roots or its ability to recruit and govern a large chunk of Yemen. All in all, military operations can well degrade Houthi capabilities temporarily, but are unlikely to eliminate the movement completely. Lasting military and political stability in Yemen will instead depend on combining calibrated force with political incentives that address the grievances and power structures underpinning the Houthis’ hold over Yemeni society.
The relationship between Iran and the Houthi movement in Yemen is far more nuanced than the common “proxy” label suggests. Rather than a one-sided dynamic in which Tehran unilaterally controls the movement, the interaction is a pragmatic partnership grounded in shared strategic and political goals; chief among them are opposition to the U.S., Israel and regional imperialism. While Iran does supply the Houthis with weapons, training and technology, the Houthis retain their own domestic agenda, decision-making structures and ideological roots in Zaidi Islam. Over time, they have leveraged Iranian support to consolidate territorial control in Yemen and to project power, most visibly in Red Sea operations, asserting themselves as an emerging transnational actor.
Indeed, both in the teachings of the Houthis and in their leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi’s speeches to his people, there is significant emphasis on the role of Iranian leaders, including controversial figures such as late military officer Qassem Soleimani. These references highlight the Houthis’ efforts to portray themselves as being in a state of ideological unity, with a shared purpose and common destiny, which in turn underscores their close relationship with Iran.
The Houthis maintain a distinct command structure and strategic agenda, consistently demonstrating operational decision-making autonomy rather than acting as mere extensions of Tehran’s will. At the same time, however, they rely heavily on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for advanced weaponry, training and logistical support, most notably in the transfer of ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial systems that underpin their regional strike capability. They have also deepened coordination with other Iranian-aligned militias, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, through Quds Force-facilitated exchanges of tactics, technology and personnel.
Despite this quasi-patronage, the Houthis pursue their own objectives in Yemen, consolidating governance over northwestern provinces and projecting power in the Red Sea to advance domestic and ideological goals beyond Tehran’s immediate directives. This hybrid model of local agency, reinforced by powerful backers, is emblematic of many modern nonstate militias, where autonomy and external sponsorship coexist in a pragmatic proxy-partner dynamic. Thus, the Houthis stand as an independent actor who adeptly leverages their relationships with Iran and similar patrons while charting a course shaped primarily by their own Yemeni-centered interests.
