In a historic turn, the PKK's announcement to lay down arms and dissolve itself after nearly five decades of violence is poised to reshape the trajectory of Kurdish political life in Türkiye. While the implications stretch across borders, the most immediate and profound impact is expected to unfold within Türkiye’s political landscape, where analysts say the long-shadowed civilian sphere of Kurdish politics may finally have room to thrive.

"With the PKK laying down arms, civilian politics will come to the fore, with significant impacts to be seen in the near future on the DEM Party and Kurdish political life in general,” Reha Ruhavioğlu, coordinator of the Kurdish Studies Center (KSC), told Daily Sabah.

He emphasized that the long-standing centrality of an "armed struggle” in the Kurdish issue has so far eclipsed purely political dialogue. "The PKK had been the major actor because it held the gun. Now, civilian politics stands out.”

Founded in the late 1970s, the PKK launched attacks against the Turkish state in 1984, resulting in over 40,000 deaths and decades of strained ethnic relations. Its dissolution now will lead political actors to fill the vacuum for Kurdish politics.

Ruhavioğlu suggests this may not only liberate the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) from associations with violence but also challenge it to redefine its political identity.

"The DEM Party will be forced to make more creative, innovative and pluralist politics,” he noted. "This will lead to significant transformation within the party ... and may allow it to turn from an identity party into a mainstream demographic party.”

Crucially, he argues, removing the stigma and risk of criminalization may encourage broader participation. "More people may enter Kurdish politics,” he said, adding that this could catalyze the emergence of alternative Kurdish parties and internal plurality within the DEM Party – previously constrained by a sense of loyalty to a singular representative force.

The DEM Party has been a key player that facilitated contact between jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan during the process, which was launched by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli under the slogan "terror-free Türkiye initiative.”

It was a significant shift for the hardline politician who had previously strongly supported the state’s military action against the group and its affiliates in the neighborhood and rejected any notion of negotiation.

On Feb. 27, Öcalan, through the DEM Party, said, "An end to the country's denial of Kurdish identity and improvements in freedom of expression led to the PKK losing its meaningfulness." Kurds make up about 20% of Türkiye's 85 million population.

The timing and decisiveness of the move also signal organizational cohesion, according to Ruhavioğlu. "The organization saying that this decision was taken unanimously also is an indicator that there are no hitches,” he said, attributing the potential for a smooth disarmament process to the PKK’s centralized structure and the authority of Öcalan.

Political normalization

But political normalization will not occur overnight. Ruhavioğlu outlined two major stages ahead: first, the technical and logistical aspects of disarmament, and second, a broader democratization process. These include the release of high-profile Kurdish politicians such as Selahattin Demirtaş, who has been jailed since 2016, the removal of state-appointed trustees from municipalities run by DEM and legal reforms to widen Kurdish political expression.

Demirtaş was convicted of inciting deadly pro-PKK riots in 2014. Similarly, court verdicts removed the DEM Party’s mayors convicted of aiding and abetting the PKK.

"In the last six months, we conducted three pieces of research,” Ruhavioğlu said. "The support of the Kurdish community for the process increased from one-third to 55% and then 65%. However, emotions such as excitement, trust and hope did not simultaneously increase. Releasing Demirtaş and withdrawing the trustees will ensure the emotional support.”

"Naming trustees (for positions of deposed mayors) will become an exceptional measure ... after the terrorist organization is dissolved," President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Wednesday, suggesting that Kurdish mayors removed from office over ties to the PKK would be reinstated.

In total, 16 opposition mayors from the DEM Party and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) have been removed since the local elections in March 2024.

Ruhavioğlu added that public demands also include stronger recognition of the Kurdish language in education and public institutions, and even limited constitutional reforms. "Even though it must not require Article 66 to change,” he said, referencing the clause that says "Everyone who is bound to the Turkish State through citizenship is Turkish,” Ruhavioğlu said, "The (Kurdish) identity may be recognized at some points.”

Turkish officials took steps to improve Kurdish rights, including allowing Kurdish-language broadcasts previously during the last attempt to reach a peace deal with the PKK between 2013 and 2015, which had collapsed.

Erdoğan already signalled a raft of legal and technical measures to support the process. The government is working on a proposal to ease prison sentences. The text, which should be submitted to Parliament by June at the latest, provides for the conditional release of all those in pretrial detention for terrorism offenses committed before July 31, 2023.

There are also plans to release to house arrest those who are sick, or women with children, if they are serving sentences of less than five years. Most of the PKK's fighters have spent the past decade in the mountains of northern Iraq. Those who have committed no crime in Türkiye will be allowed to return without fear of prosecution. But the PKK's leaders are expected to be forced into exile in third-party states.

The president said developments and further dialogue between political parties on the process will be seen once the PKK actually lays down arms. The National Intelligence Organization (MIT) is expected to supervise the weapons handover at locations in Türkiye, Syria and Iraq.

Regional implications

The ripple effects are already being felt beyond Türkiye’s borders. "Besides being a great strategic gain for Türkiye, the PKK laying down arms will have big reflections in both Iraq and Syria,” said Mehmet Alaca, an expert on Middle Eastern affairs.

The PKK announcement could end one of the Middle East’s longest-running terrorist insurgencies and foster stability in the region. Öcalan's overture came at a time of fundamental changes reshaping the region, including the reconfiguration of power in Syria after the toppling of Bashar Assad, the weakening of the Hezbollah militant movement in Lebanon and the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza.

Iraq, long the PKK’s operational base, may see improved diplomatic ties with Ankara. "Even though the PKK has been announced a banned organization, several actors in Baghdad described Türkiye’s counterterrorism operations and military bases within Iraqi territory as a violation of its sovereignty,” Alaca noted.

With the PKK’s withdrawal, Turkish-Iraqi relations are expected to stabilize. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), particularly in Irbil and Suleymaniyah, could find new space for political normalization.

"The PKK was undermining Ankara-Irbil, Ankara-Suleymaniyah as well as Irbil-Suleymaniyah relations,” Alaca said. "The PKK's dissolution will most certainly contribute to intra-Kurdish dialogue.”

Alaca also pointed to the potential liberation of hundreds of villages under PKK occupation in northern Iraq and the end of fraternal conflict between the PKK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However, he cautioned that remnants such as the PKK-linked Sinjar Resistance Units (YBŞ) could pose new challenges.

On a broader geopolitical level, Alaca suggested the PKK’s move could shift regional dynamics, including curbing Iranian influence. "The PKK had implicit and tactical ties to Iran and Iranian-backed Shiite militias,” he said, noting that the weakening of similar actors like Hezbollah and the Assad regime further opens the door for Turkish strategic gains.

"It would not be speculative to say that in this new status quo, Ankara’s Achilles’ heel, injured by Tehran, may heal while Iran may attempt to narrow down Ankara’s range of action in Iraq," Alaca said, adding that the decision of PJAK (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan), the Iranian offshoot of the PKK, remains unclear. "PJAK may prepare for the new process through not leaving arms against Tahran to take advantage of conventional pressure toward Iran.”

"In Syria’s geopolitics meanwhile the YPG is the most critical actor.

In Syria, the process is intertwined with Kurdish dynamics there, particularly involving the U.S.-backed YPG and its umbrella organization, the SDF. Alaca highlighted a recent agreement between interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and YPG leader Ferhat Abdi Şahin, code-named Mazloum Kobani, implying coordination with the broader disarmament initiative.

The course of events in Syria is a red line for Ankara, and there does not seem to be a major problem at the moment,” he said.

Ultimately, Alaca views the PKK’s announcement as irreversible: "The PKK’s announcement of dissolution has been made with so strong statements that there is no return anymore,” he said.

"There is no need for an armed struggle in Türkiye and Syria anymore ... Thus, the PKK seems to have reached its natural boundaries.”

As Türkiye stands at what Ruhavioğlu described as a "second historical juncture” – echoing the early Republican promise of Turkish-Kurdish unity – both the state and society face a test of vision and patience. If managed with inclusivity and institutional reform, the PKK’s exit could mark not only the end of one era but the beginning of another: a more democratic, pluralistic and enduring Kurdish political presence in Türkiye.